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Abstract 
This paper outlines a new scheme for bioethical arguments of “enhancement” by introducing 
the concept of “form of life.” Many authors have argued about the morality of enhancement 
technologies, but their conflict seems unsolvable because there is no common ground to 
discuss the morality of enhancement as long as they adhere to their approval or disapproval. 
This paper proposes the concept of form of life as a common ground, and then studies that 
concept in two parts: reflection on our desire, and philosophical investigation of some forms 
of life. 
 
1. Introduction: Beyond the “Proponents vs. Opponents” Scheme 
 
Many literatures in bioethics discuss the morality of “enhancement.” 
They argue about how enhancement affects safety, equality, liberty, virtues 
and other ethical concepts, and also how we can understand the new 
technology through these concepts. Clearly, there seems an unsolvable 
controversy between the proponents and the opponents of enhancement: 
generally speaking, the proponents appeal to our basic right of liberty to 
pursue our own happiness through every possible means, including 
enhancement technologies, while the opponents are emotionally 
apprehensive about enhancement’s corrosive effect on our authentic lives. 
Compromise seems impossible because, in a pluralistic society, it is 
difficult to have any rational discussion between those with different value 
systems. In other words, when one regards liberal values as the highest, 
while the other regards conservative values as the highest, we can only 
apparently leave them in conflict. 
However, the real gap is not between the proponents and the opponents 
                                                      
 Graduate Student, Humanities and Social Sciences, Osaka Prefecture University, Gakuencho, 
Sakai, Osaka, Japan 5998531.  60 
 
(or “liberal view” and “conservative view”) of enhancement, but rather 
between two ethical approaches to its “morality.” For convenience, I call 
one “approach A” and another “approach B.” Daniel Callahan clearly 
describes the distinction between the two approaches (parenthetical 
numbers and italics mine). 
 
While it was less easy to see at the time, bioethics quickly came to a 
crossroad in the 1970’s. One route lay in (1) the direction of 
increased patient autonomy, the dominance of rights language, the 
possibilities of enhanced personal choice and a richer life through 
medical means, and a scanting of an ethic of responsibility. The 
other route lay in (2) the direction of asking about the cultural and 
social significance of the medical developments, and inquiring in 
particular which kinds of technological innovations, with what kinds 
of choices, might lead to better human communities. … In the end, 
the field of bioethics mainly took the first route.
1  
 
Temporarily, I define the two approaches as that (1) above is the 
characteristics of approach A and (2) is that of approach B. It is very 
important to note here that A and B do not necessarily correspond to 
approval or disapproval of any particular biotechnologies. That is, there 
should be a proponent and opponent of enhancement technologies 
approaching the problem of its morality through both approach A and B. 
In this essay, I describe the contrast between approach A and B by 
quoting some examples from literatures of enhancement arguments. I 
elaborate their definitions and articulate the current state of enhancement 
discourse.  
I treat the different kinds of enhancement technologies as a whole in 
this paper: genetic, neural, pharmaceutical, surgical, etc., because their 
arguments share a basic ethical framework, though the social, legal, 
economic, and technological details are different.   
Also, in this paper I use the word “enhancement” in common sense of 
using medical technologies in a way beyond treating illness. The exact 
borderline between treatment and enhancement may be drawn by a 
sociological study on medicalization, otherwise it is merely a technical 
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distinction for health care providers and insurance companies. We surely 
need that kind of study, but it is not undertaken here. 
Third, to focus on the enhancement of one’s self, I will not deal with 
the problem of enhancing a baby. As for the difference between enhancing 
oneself and enhancing a baby, the latter requires the standpoint of the baby 
who was enhanced or even was born by someone else’s will, and would 
complicate the argument beyond recognition. Since the enhanced baby 
must be made by someone else’s intention, the arguments must involve a 
philosophical exploration of the foundation of the baby’s existence and 
identity. Surely, the argument of enhancing oneself involves the concept of 
existence and identity in some sense, but such application of the 
technologies does not affect the foundation of one’s existence; it is still 
something given, not made. As for parents who want to have an enhanced 
baby, the difficulty is if it could be possible for them to enhance a baby for 
the baby’s own sake. If parents regard their baby just as means to satisfy 
their own desire, it is not enhancement of the baby, but of the parents after 
all. Thus, to argue about an enhanced baby we need a philosophical 
reexamination of the meaning of having a baby. In any case, I leave this 
difficult problem for now. 
Finally, I must quickly review the “inevitability thesis” of genetic 
enhancement claimed by Françoise Baylis and Jason S. Robert. They give 
many reasons for the inevitability of development of genetic enhancement 
technologies and conclude that “genetic enhancement technologies are 
inevitable because the future is ours for the shaping.”
 2 I agree, but this is 
just the start of the argument, not the end. The problem is not whether 
enhancement is inevitable, but how we should develop it. For example, 
development of transportation is an inevitable trend in society, but that 
trend itself cannot suggest any particular way to develop it: motorization 
and highway system, or public mass rail transportation system. Similarly, 
although enhancing our performance is an inevitable trend for us as 
creative beings, we need to figure out how we should carry out that project, 
which is the very problem I begin to answer here. 
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2. Two Approaches in Ethics to Enhancement Technologies 
 
Here I describe the typical form of approaches A and B and their 
reasoning. Although there are some variations, approach A tends to be 
adopted typically by the proponents of enhancement technologies, and 
approach B by the opponents. In doing so, I combine some literatures to 
make typical arguments; no authors claim exactly what I describe, and the 
texts quoted do not represent their authors’ view as a whole, verbatim. 
These examples of the two approaches are quoted to show the styles of the 
approaches, not the judgments on enhancement their authors claim. 
 
2.1. Approach A 
 
One typical example of approach A is Richard H. Dees’ paper on 
neuroenhancement. He articulates his reasoning of the morality of 
neuroenhancement:
3 
 
(1) People have a right to autonomy.   
(2) If a person has a right to autonomy, then if she deems something 
important and if pursuing it does not harm others, then it is 
morally permissible for her to do so.   
(3) Some people will find that neuroenhancements are important to 
them.  
(4) Neuroenhancements cause no one else harm.   
(5) Therefore, the use of neuroenhancements is morally permissible. 
 
Then, he argues that “the key to this argument are obviously premise (2) 
and (4).”
4 For Dees, the key to enhancement ethics is the general ethical 
concept of autonomy and the harm principle: “as long as an enhancement 
technology is safe and effective and as long as it does not harm others, then 
individuals should be able to decide for themselves how they should live 
their lives.”
5  
Dees examines some objections against enhancement based on these 
                                                      
3  Dees (2007), p.373. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid.,  p.372.  63 
 
premises: safety and equality in using them, possible coercion in 
competitive circumstances, human dignity it may erode, and so on. He does 
not claim that every enhancement technology is already safe, that it may 
not cause any inequality and coercion, and that it dehumanizes nobody. 
What he argues is that, although we should mind the possible harms that 
enhancement might cause, they do not tarnish the intrinsic nature of 
“(neuro)enhancement as such,”
6 as his term, but with the circumstances 
around them or immature technique. Some authors share Dees’ reasoning. 
 
We arrive at the best internal and social arrangements by allowing 
informed prospective parents to be guided by their values in 
choosing enhancements.
7 
 
Technology in itself isn’t driving us in any particular direction – I 
believe that we decide where it should go.
8 
 
The first quotation is “liberal eugenicist” Nicholas Agar about the 
enhancement of a baby. When we replace “prospective parents” with 
“agents” we grasp his general idea on enhancement. The second quotation 
is Arthur Caplan from his debate with Carl Elliott. By combining them, we 
can see their strong belief in autonomy of agents and neutrality of 
technology, which is the basis of approach A. 
We can now fully formulate approach A.
9 As we see above, it 
presupposes the agent’s autonomy and technology’s neutrality from any 
ideology. Its moral principle is a combination of the liberalistic right of 
individual choice and the harm principle. Its typical terminology is safety, 
fairness, equality, rights, utility, which can work as a constraint on an 
autonomous agent. Then, the argument unfolds along the lines that if it is 
not safe or fair to use enhancement, or if it violates someone’s right or 
equality in general, or if it causes more harm than benefit, these uses should 
be prohibited. Otherwise agents have the right to do anything they want 
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with enhancement. Under what condition agents can use enhancement 
safely, harmlessly, fairly, is left to further practical studies. For approach A, 
therefore, the morality of enhancement is reduced to its certain 
permissibility. Then, the staple answer to the ethical question is 
“enhancement is not intrinsically wrong and we do not need any blanket 
ban on it. Whether a particular use of enhancement technologies is 
permissible or not depends on whether it’s safe, fair to use, harmless to 
others.” 
Although no one might disagree with that statement, approach A should 
not satisfy those who are concerned with the morality of enhancement 
because permissibility is not equal to moral goodness. Dees recognizes (2) 
and (4) as key, which represents his liberalistic value. However, 
considering moral goodness, (3) is the key premise: “Some people will find 
that neuroenhancements are important to them.” Moral goodness asks why 
and how agents think that neuroenhancements are important to them, but 
approach A (Dees) disregards that question to personal preference, not 
ethics. (3) seems to presuppose that agents are competent to judge what is 
important, but this cannot be presupposed at all.   
In other words, since “that we choose is best” is different from “what 
we choose is the best” unless we regard free choice itself as the highest 
value regardless of its content, motive, and purpose, to discuss the morality 
of enhancement we should examine not only its permissibility in terms of 
autonomy and the harm principle, but how enhancement could help us live 
better lives in terms of virtue and human flourishing. To do so, we have to 
explore what drives agents to use enhancement, what makes us think 
enhancement is good for us, and what is ultimately good – approach B.   
 
2.2. Approach B 
 
The proponents of approach B are mainly those who are called 
“conservatives,” but that does not mean that approach B is the approach 
taken only by “conservatives” and that approach B is defined as a 
conservative approach. Exemplars of approach B include Leon Kass, 
Michael Sandel, Francis Fukuyama, Carl Elliott and Daniel Callahan. They 
succinctly express the central idea of approach B. 
Sandel writes:  65 
 
 
I am suggesting… that the moral stakes in the enhancement debate 
are not fully captured by the familiar categories of autonomy and 
rights, on the one hand, and the calculation of cost and benefits, on 
the other. My concern with enhancement is not as individual vice but 
as habit of mind and way of being.
10 
 
To paraphrase Sandel, neither deontology based on autonomous rational 
individuals nor utilitarianism which calculates consequences caused by 
enhancement technologies are sufficient to grasp the morality of 
enhancement, because “the moral” is not merely permissibility, but the way 
of being good.   
Kass writes: 
 
Mastery of the means of intervention without knowing the goodness 
of the goals of intervening is not, in fact, mastery at all. In the 
absence of such knowledge of ends, the goals of the “master” will be 
set… by whatever it is that happens to guide or move his will…
11 
 
Kass is concerned with the “end” of our lives, which cannot be dealt by 
approach A. Unlike the approach A, the purpose of approach B is not to 
draw the line between the permissible and impermissible, and not to 
produce a method for such drawing, but questioning how agents can live 
better with enhancement. It does not leave the determination about what is 
good and bad to individualistic personal choice, which approach A 
presumes to be immune from public discussion. Instead, approach B tries to 
discuss what should be regarded as good life and bad life, and why. 
Fukuyama writes: 
 
The deepest fear that people express about technology is not a 
utilitarian one at all. It is rather a fear that, in the end, biotechnology 
will cause us in some way to lose our humanity – that is, some 
essential quality that has always underpinned our sense of who we 
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are and where we are going,…
12 
 
Fukuyama’s view of enhancement is somewhat unusual because he 
advocates liberalistic values despite being skeptical of “liberalistic use” of 
enhancement. Sandel and Kass agree that we should value tradition and 
community, that these values should guide us in dealing with enhancement. 
Fukuyama points out that “liberalistic use” of enhancement should spoil the 
liberalistic values themselves: enhancement that flattens our diversity and 
simplifies our complicated emotional activity makes our democratic society 
dysfunctional by reducing us into scientific mechanisms, not treating us as 
rational agents that compose liberalistic, democratic society.   
For all three authors, the discussion on enhancement should not be 
based on the permissibility or the right of free choice, but on how we can 
live well with such technologies – the basic concern of approach B. 
Sandel, Kass, and Fukuyama are basically skeptical of enhancement, 
but Donna Haraway, the author of A Cyborg Manifesto, welcomes 
enhancement within the framework of approach B. Haraway is not 
specialized in bioethics or medicine, and her writing is dated. Also, since 
her writing are in the so called “post-modernistic” style, it seems very 
different from the other examples above. However, her insight into 
enhancement (cyborg) still has great importance. She writes, “it is crucial 
to remember that what is lost, perhaps especially from women’s point of 
view, is often virulent forms of oppression, nostalgically naturalized in the 
face of current violation.”
13 This is an acute criticism against an opponent 
of enhancement like Kass. For Haraway, enhancement could enable us to 
reform current oppressive social structures, like gender order. From her 
point of view, a conservative writer who is skeptical of enhancement – 
Kass – becomes a protector of current oppression. 
Between Kass and Haraway, for example, there can be an effective 
discussion of the morality of enhancement, in spite of their differences, 
because they share a concrete idea of good life and of how it is affected by 
enhancement. However, Dees and Kass (or Haraway), cannot have such a 
discussion because they ask different questions. 
 
                                                      
12  Fukuyama (2002), p.101. 
13 Haraway  (1991),  p.172.  67 
 
2.3. Introducing Form of Life 
 
How we should consider the goodness and the badness of our lives? To 
answer that question, one basic concept should be taken as the foundation 
of approach B: form of life.
14 In any discussion of what should be good or 
bad in our lives, we inevitably presuppose some form of life as the 
foundation on which we value things, because goodness and badness do not 
make sense if our lives are amorphous: no beginning, no purpose, no peak, 
no conversion, no end.   
Table 1 shows the framework of this argument. My argument is not that 
we should oppose enhancement or abandon approach A, but that we should 
see the problem through another scheme, in addition to approach A. In 
Table 1, the row of “‘Form of Life’ Oriented Scheme” does not have the 
distinction between proponents and opponents of enhancement, because 
approach B does not aim to approve or disapprove certain enhancement 
technologies; it implies that approach B is purely the way of thinking.   
 
Table 1. Two Schemes of Thinking about Enhancement 
 Proponents  Opponents 
Conventional 
Scheme 
Right of Free Choice &
Harm Principle 
(Approach A) 
Emotional Antipathy 
“Form of Life” 
Oriented Scheme 
Reflection on Our Desire & 
Philosophical Investigation into Forms of Life 
(Approach B) 
 
3. The Importance of Approach B 
 
Approach A is an attractive way to talk about enhancement because it is 
about safety, fairness, and equality; approach B may seem less attractive. 
Some might think that it is better to leave the questions of approach B to 
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personal conscience, that it cannot be a public affair. Approach B, however, 
should be public for three reasons. 
First, proponents of enhancement might ask: Who in the world does not 
think that being smarter and more attentive is good? Does anyone actually 
think it is better to be dumber and less attentive? Dees says, “a world in 
which people have greater intellectual skills, have shaper memories, and 
can control their moods is a world in which people are more productive and 
happier.”
15 Why and how enhancement should benefit us seems obvious. 
But I raise four questions against them. (1) What do “smarter” and “more 
attentive” in question means? Does being smarter mean simply higher 
grades in class, or is it more complicated? (2) Do being smarter and being 
more attentive with drugs have the same meaning and value, as those 
without drugs have? Do the users of the drugs really think of themselves as 
so? Is that (self-)deception? (3) How do we get to think a certain type of 
smartness and attentiveness is better? Are they universally good, or are we 
just possessed with them? (4) How are they able to result in a “happier” 
life? Is forcing a child to be attentive to a boring lecture by using drugs 
making the child’s life happier? What is the happier life? To answer these 
kinds of questions, the proponents of enhancement must illuminate their 
idea of goodness and badness actually, which is the key to approach B. 
That is, when we try to answer those questions, we must enter the domain 
of approach B. 
Second, enhancement literature frequently includes arguments that we 
have used “traditional enhancement” before “new enhancement,” which 
has been brought by high-tech medicine. A common example is education, 
which can be called “intellectual enhancement” in terms of new 
enhancement. Some argue that we should not worry about the new 
enhancement technologies more than old ones like education. Even those 
who question the benefit of enhancement sometimes accept the idea that 
education is a kind of enhancement.
16   But regarding education as 
enhancement is a “retrospective fallacy” in that one interprets something 
that has existed for long time and so has a long history only in a 
contemporary sense. For example, although coffee contains caffeine which 
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is a stimulant, it is irrelevant to reduce the old habit of coffee drinking into 
the practice of “enhancing attentiveness,” because the coffee drinking is 
embedded in larger social, historical, and cultural context. Likewise, before 
“new enhancement technologies” emerged, we might not have considered 
education as a kind of enhancement in the sense of new enhancement, 
because it has had public, communal values that cannot be reduced to 
enhancement in the contemporary meaning – solidarity, social welfare, and 
cultivation of social elegance were also involved. In contrast, the 
contemporary examples regard education as only a kind of enhancement to 
develop professional skill to build one’s career. Thus, we should not only 
discuss the morality of “new enhancement,” but also our habit of mind that 
reinterprets even long standing social and cultural activities like education 
as a sort of personal enhancement. 
Third, it may be said that we should distinguish the distinction between 
individual well-being and social well-being, and that approach B should be 
left to the domain of individual well-being, which is pursued individually 
rather than publicly. However, the distinguishing characteristics of 
approach A/B are not equivalent to those of individual/social well-being. 
We should think of both sides of well-being in terms of both approaches. It 
is impossible to untangle the complicated relations among them here, but I 
can give some basic arguments on the distinction between individual and 
social well-being, and show why understanding their relation is so difficult.   
For instance, living a longer and healthier life might be better for 
individuals, but might disturb the “proper” alternation of generations. Or, 
taking advantage on an exam by taking a pill might be good for individuals, 
but it makes a fierce competition desperate. These are two separate cases. 
The first case is that enhancing the individual is actually good for the 
enhanced and causes social influence that could leave society in confusion 
temporarily, as vaccination has done. Then, we should incorporate that new 
individual good into society. On the other hand, in the second case, the 
individual good brought by enhancement that seems apparently good for 
the enhanced is not good for the society as a whole. The student might be 
able to take advantage on the exam by using drugs, but if that becomes a 
common social practice it may create a circumstance that reinforces the 
needs for stimulants. In terms of approach A, we should revise the rule of 
the exam to cover the use of drugs. In terms of approach B, however, we  70 
 
should ask if the goodness of individual well-being which is bought at the 
expense of social good is really good not only in terms of social well-being, 
but also in terms of individual well-being. 
The concept of complicity is helpful here. Margaret Olivia Little, in the 
context of cosmetic surgery that is regarded as a kind of enhancement,
17 
argues that, when one has a cosmetic surgery to alter one’s appearance, one 
might consciously or subconsciously be doing so in conspiracy with the 
“suspect social norm”
18 of beauty, because that surgery might reinforce 
that norm of how one should look. As the norm is more suspicious, the 
surgery is more guilty; Little’s worst-case example is an African-American 
who wants to look whiter.
19 If we examine the case only in terms of 
approach A, we do not find any reason why that treatment is suspicious as 
far as it is safe and easy to access, and a client is well informed and 
autonomous. When we consider the harmful social consequence of such a 
treatment in terms of approach B, however, we ask about what kind of 
society we want to live in. The question evolves into individual well-being 
again – if one’s action, which is apparently good for oneself, causes bad 
social consequences, is one’s action ultimately good for one’s self? 
Let’s take a look at the example of a gun, which could be called an 
enhancement technology. Having a gun is apparently good for its owner 
because it makes possible for him or her to have more power and security. 
But the society in which everyone has a gun might not be a good society 
and might not be secure at all. As for individual well-being also, it is 
doubtful that having a gun to protect oneself is better way to live because 
the human relationship is fundamentally based on trust in others. If we 
think about the gun case in terms of approach A, and if the gun is cheap and 
easy to access and people are supposed to be autonomous and responsible 
enough to use it only in self-protection, there is no reason to regulate 
individual gun ownership. When thought of only in terms of approach A, 
the argument of the new enhancement technologies follows the same line.
20 
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In summary, not publicly discussing approach B encourages the wrong 
use of enhancement technologies. The liberalistic argument implying that 
we are allowed to pursue whatever we want might foster the use of 
enhancement technologies according to the stereotyped ideas of beauty, 
smartness, and any other imperfect ideas of good. When our environments 
are doubtful, it is wrong to adapt to them by changing and enhancing 
ourselves, even though doing so should not be prohibited. We must change 
the environment based on the basic idea of human life, which is what 
approach B is about. 
 
4. Conclusion: Two-Sided Approach to Approach B 
 
At the end of the section 2, the concept of form of life was introduced 
as the foundation of approach B. We must take it as the foundation because, 
in this world of pluralistic value systems, we should first ensure that we do 
not fall into nihilistic relativism. There, anything can be valuable for those 
who value it, otherwise nothing can be valuable, and then nothing can 
ground one’s sense of value besides one’s own desire. One possible way to 
avoid nihilism is based on human nature, which is thought to be substantial 
and universal.
21 However, even if a universal human nature was proven, it 
would not suggest any goodness or badness unless it was true that 
following that nature is good.
22  Therefore, we should think about what we 
should regard as good.   
This requires the concept of form of life to give our life a form, which 
is essential regardless of the definition of good, as an amorphous life is not 
a life that can live meaningfully. To get rid of this amorphousness, two 
kinds of study should work cooperatively.
23 
One is a reflection on our desires behind free choice, which is regarded 
as the only source of value by some proponents of enhancement. Each case 
differs according to what drives us to use enhancement technologies. If 
there is a naturally skinny man, for example, does he possess the same 
desire to use steroids if he wants to be a bodybuilder for his own 
satisfaction, or if he wants to be a fire fighter because his family was lost in 
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fire? Or, if we invented the technology that makes it possible for us to 
hibernate, is the desire to use it for prolonging life to wait until a new 
treatment for a currently incurable cancer equal to the desire to use it 
enable astronauts to explore outer space? All of these kinds of cases can be 
based on autonomous free choice that harms no one. Their desires behind 
their choices, however, may be morally different and thus we must take 
their desires into account to assess their actual form of life. 
The other study is rethinking of our finiteness, communality, 
fellowship, and other concepts that may constitute a basic frame of our 
form of life together. Kass, Sandel and Callahan worry that enhancement 
technologies erode our essential and indispensable form of life, which 
enable us to live flourishing lives together.   
According to Sandel there must be two domains of our lives; giftedness 
in which we must not try to change things arbitrarily but accept things as 
such, and willfulness in which we are trying to create, transform, and 
destroy things to make them cohere with our plan. It would be dubious to 
turn everything into the domain of willfulness by enhancement 
technologies. For example, having a baby without a sense of giftedness 
may make it impossible for parents to build a healthy relationship with 
their children. 
According to Kass and Callahan, death and community as ultimate 
limitations and indispensable conditions of our lives should give our lives 
clearer shape. Making children calmer by medicating them may make it 
difficult to have a sense of education as communal cooperation. Or, taking 
an antidepressant may get in the way of a healthy grief process that 
recognizes death as the ultimate end of life. 
 To be sure, there are many enhancement technologies which do not 
affect a form of life like the improvement of eyesight. There are also some 
concepts, such as that of gender order, that play an important role in our 
lives but are not indispensable. We should explore what our essential form 
of life is, and how enhancement technologies affect it. 
Those two studies – defining desire and form of life – should work 
cooperatively so that we can resolve the issue of enhancement technologies.   
The ethics of enhancement is not an abstract object of conceptual ethics, 
but a socio-cultural entity within which we live our daily lives.  73 
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